

# Strategy The Logic Of War And Peace Revised And Enlarged Edition

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*Strategies of Peace* - Daniel Philpott 2010-03-24  
How can a just peace be built in sites of genocide, massive civil war, dictatorship, terrorism, and poverty? In *Strategies of Peace*,

the first volume in the Studies in Strategic Peacebuilding series, fifteen leading scholars propose an imaginative and provocative approach to peacebuilding. Today the dominant

thinking is the "liberal peace," which stresses cease fires, elections, and short run peace operations carried out by international institutions, western states, and local political elites. But the liberal peace is not enough, the authors argue. A just and sustainable peace requires a far more holistic vision that links together activities, actors, and institutions at all levels. By exploring innovative models for building lasting peace—a United Nations counter-terrorism policy that also promotes good governance; coordination of the international prosecution of war criminals with local efforts to settle civil wars; increasing the involvement of religious leaders, who have a unique ability to elicit peace settlements; and many others—the authors advance a bold new vision for peacebuilding.

*The Strategy Bridge* - Colin S. Gray 2016-07-04  
The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von

Clausewitz, Sun-tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, *The Strategy Bridge* is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general

strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it "joins up the dots" from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his

prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy - Dr. Harry R. Yarger 2006

Strategy for the nation-state is neither simple nor easy. Good strategy demands much of the military professional whether he is formulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing strategy. Few do it well. It requires the professional to step out of the planning mind set and adopt one more suited for the strategic environment. This is particularly true in periods of great change and turmoil when a successful military strategy must be closely integrated with and may depend on other national strategies of the interagency community. A theory of strategy helps in this transition by educating the professional and disciplining his thinking in any of his roles. This monograph advances a theory of strategy that provides essential terminology and definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and

premises, and substantive hypotheses that explain the nature of the strategic environment and the role and expectations of strategy. The environment is explained in theoretical and practical terms, and the implications for strategic thinking are developed with a distinction being made between strategy and planning mind sets. The typical problems practitioners have in formulating and articulating strategy are discussed. Strategy formulation is recognized as both an art and science, and the U.S. Army War College strategy model of ends, ways, and means is expounded on and advocated as a methodology for articulating strategies.

### **Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century -**

Hew Strachan 2007-09-13

The volume considers Clausewitz's timeless *On War* against the background of actual armed conflict. With scholars from a range of disciplines and countries, it throws new light on a classic text and contemporary issues.

### **Logics of War - Alex Weisiger 2013-03-19**

Most wars between countries end quickly and at relatively low cost. The few in which high-intensity fighting continues for years bring about a disproportionate amount of death and suffering. What separates these few unusually long and intense wars from the many conflicts that are far less destructive? In *Logics of War*, Alex Weisiger tests three explanations for a nation's decision to go to war and continue fighting regardless of the costs. He combines sharp statistical analysis of interstate wars over the past two centuries with nine narrative case studies. He examines both well-known conflicts like World War II and the Persian Gulf War, as well as unfamiliar ones such as the 1864-1870 Paraguayan War (or the War of the Triple Alliance), which proportionally caused more deaths than any other war in modern history. When leaders go to war expecting easy victory, events usually correct their misperceptions quickly and with fairly low casualties, thereby

setting the stage for a negotiated agreement. A second explanation involves motives born of domestic politics; as war becomes more intense, however, leaders are increasingly constrained in their ability to continue the fighting. Particularly destructive wars instead arise from mistrust of an opponent's intentions. Countries that launch preventive wars to forestall expected decline tend to have particularly ambitious war aims that they hold to even when fighting goes poorly. Moreover, in some cases, their opponents interpret the preventive attack as evidence of a dispositional commitment to aggression, resulting in the rejection of any form of negotiation and a demand for unconditional surrender. Weisiger's treatment of a topic of central concern to scholars of major wars will also be read with great interest by military historians, political psychologists, and sociologists.

*Strategy* - Edward Luttwak 2001

“If you want peace, prepare for war.”

buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive. “The worst road may be the best route to battle.” Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows “they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict. In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of “post-heroic” war in Kosovo in 1999 “an American war in which not a single American soldier was killed. In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa

and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world's foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.

Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies - Frank C. Zagare 2018-12-26

Known as the science of strategy, game theory is a branch of mathematics that has gained broad acceptance as a legitimate methodological tool, and has been widely adapted by a number of other fields. Frank C. Zagare provides an introduction to the application of game theory in the fields of security studies and diplomatic history, demonstrating the advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events and strategic relationships.

Comprised of three parts, the first illustrates the basic concepts of game theory, initially with abstract examples but later in the context of real world foreign policy decision-making. The author

highlights the methodological problems of using game theory to construct an analytic narrative and the advantages of working around these obstacles. Part II develops three extended case studies that illustrate the theory at work: the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, the July Crisis of 1914, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Finally, in Part III, Zagare describes a general theory of interstate conflict initiation, limitation, escalation, and resolution and rebuts criticisms of the methodology. Logically demanding, Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies conveys an intuitive understanding of the theory of games through the use of real-world examples to exemplify the 'theory in action'.

Strategic Thinking in 3D - Ross Harrison 2013-05-31

Effective strategic thinking requires a clear understanding of one's external environment. Each organization has a unique environment, but as Ross Harrison explains in Strategic

Thinking in 3D, any environment-whether in the fields of national security, foreign policy, or business-has three dimensions: systems, opponents, and groups.

*Conflict After the Cold War* - Richard K. Betts  
2017-03-27

Edited by one of the most renowned scholars in the field, Richard Betts' *Conflict After the Cold War* assembles classic and contemporary readings on enduring problems of international security. Offering broad historical and philosophical breadth, the carefully chosen and excerpted selections in this popular reader help students engage key debates over the future of war and the new forms that violent conflict will take. *Conflict After the Cold War* encourages closer scrutiny of the political, economic, social, and military factors that drive war and peace. New to the Fifth Edition: Original introductions to each of 10 major parts as well as to the book as a whole have been updated by the author. An entirely new section (Part IX) on "Threat

Assessment and Misjudgment" explores fundamental problems in diagnosing danger, understanding strategic choices, and measuring costs against benefits in wars over limited stakes. 12 new readings have been added or revised: Fred C. Iklé, "The Dark Side of Progress" G. John Ikenberry, "China's Choice" Kenneth N. Waltz, "Why Nuclear Proliferation May Be Good" Daniel Byman, "Drones: Technology Serves Strategy" Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Drones: Tactics Undermine Strategy" Eyre Crowe and Thomas Sanderson, "The German Threat? 1907" Neville Henderson, "The German Threat? 1938" Vladimir Putin, "The Threat to Ukraine from the West" Eliot A. Cohen, "The Russian Threat" James C. Thomson, Jr., "How Could Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy" Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan's Legacy" Martin C. Libicki, "Why Cyberdeterrence is Different" [The Glorious Art of Peace](#) - John Gittings  
2012-02-23

A ground-breaking history of the arts of peace,

from Confucius and Ancient Greece through to the 21st century, opening an alternative window on history to show the strength of the case for peace which has been argued from ancient times onwards.

The Geography of War and Peace - Colin Flint 2005

Our world of increasing and varied conflicts is confusing and threatening to citizens of all countries, as they try to understand its causes and consequences. This book takes advantage of a diversity of geographic perspectives as it analyzes the political processes of war and their spatial expression.

**The Pentagon and the Art of War** - Edward Luttwak 1984

The Pentagon's New Map - Thomas P.M. Barnett 2005-05-03

Since the end of the Cold War, America's national security establishment has been searching for a new operating theory to explain

how this seemingly "chaotic" world actually works. Gone is the clash of blocs, but replaced by what? Thomas Barnett has the answers. A senior military analyst with the U.S. Naval War College, he has given a constant stream of briefings over the past few years, and particularly since 9/11, to the highest of high-level civilian and military policymakers-and now he gives it to you. The Pentagon's New Map is a cutting-edge approach to globalization that combines security, economic, political, and cultural factors to do no less than predict and explain the nature of war and peace in the twenty-first century. Building on the works of Friedman, Huntington, and Fukuyama, and then taking a leap beyond, Barnett crystallizes recent American military history and strategy, sets the parameters for where our forces will likely be headed in the future, outlines the unique role that America can and will play in establishing international stability-and provides much-needed hope at a crucial yet uncertain time in world

history. For anyone seeking to understand the Iraqs, Afghanistans, and Liberias of the present and future, the intimate new links between foreign policy and national security, and the operational realities of the world as it exists today, The Pentagon's New Map is a template, a Rosetta stone. Agree with it, disagree with it, argue with it-there is no book more essential for 2004 and beyond.

**International Conflict** - Stephen L.

Quackenbush 2014-08-12

Introducing students to key theories and empirical findings of international conflict stemming from scientific research on core facets, this book covers the whole process of interstate war, from causes of conflict to escalation, conduct, resolution and recurrence.

*The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* -

Edward Luttwak 2016-05-18

A newly updated edition of this classic, hugely influential account of how the Romans defended their vast empire. At the height of its power, the

Roman Empire encompassed the entire Mediterranean basin, extending much beyond it from Britain to Mesopotamia, from the Rhine to the Black Sea. Rome prospered for centuries while successfully resisting attack, fending off everything from overnight robbery raids to full-scale invasion attempts by entire nations on the move. How were troops able to defend the Empire's vast territories from constant attacks? And how did they do so at such moderate cost that their treasury could pay for an immensity of highways, aqueducts, amphitheaters, city baths, and magnificent temples? In *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, seasoned defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak reveals how the Romans were able to combine military strength, diplomacy, and fortifications to effectively respond to changing threats. Rome's secret was not ceaseless fighting, but comprehensive strategies that unified force, diplomacy, and an immense infrastructure of roads, forts, walls, and barriers. Initially relying on client states to

buffer attacks, Rome moved to a permanent frontier defense around 117 CE. Finally, as barbarians began to penetrate the empire, Rome fielded large armies in a strategy of “defense-in-depth,” allowing invaders to pierce Rome’s borders. This updated edition has been extensively revised to incorporate recent scholarship and archeological findings. A new preface explores Roman imperial statecraft. This illuminating book remains essential to both ancient historians and students of modern strategy.

**Strategy** - Edward Luttwak 1987

Uses an abundant variety of historical examples to examine the true nature of strategy and demonstrates the failure of commonsense logic in particular strategic concepts

*The Drone Age* - Michael J. Boyle 2020

"What impact will drone technology have on the patterns of war and peace in the next century? Will drones produce a more peaceful world because they reduce risk to pilots, or will the

prospect of clean, remote warfare lead governments to engage in more conflicts? Will drones begin to replace humans on the battlefield or will they empower soldiers and peacekeepers to act more precisely and humanely in crisis zones? How will terrorist organizations turn this technology back on the governments that fight them? How will drones change surveillance at war - and at home? As drones come into the hands of new actors - foreign governments, law enforcement, terrorist organizations, humanitarian organizations and even UN peacekeepers, it is even more important to understand what kind of world they might produce. This book explores how the unique features of drone technology alter the strategic choices of governments and non-state actors alike by transforming their risk calculations and expanding their goals on and off the battlefield. By changing what these actors are willing and capable of doing, drones are quietly altering the dynamics of wars,

humanitarian crises and peacekeeping missions while generating new risks to security and to privacy. An essential guide to a potentially disruptive force in modern world politics, *The Drone Age* argues that the mastery of drone technology will become central to the ways that governments and non-state actors seek power and influence in the coming decades."--

**Explaining War and Peace** - Jack Levy  
2007-06-18

This edited volume focuses on the use of 'necessary condition counterfactuals' in explaining two key events in twentieth century history, the origins of the First World War and the end of the Cold War. Containing essays by leading figures in the field, this book analyzes the causal logics of necessary and sufficient conditions, demonstrates the variety of different ways in which necessary condition counterfactuals are used to explain the causes of individual events, and identifies errors commonly made in applying this form of causal

logic to individual events. It includes discussions of causal chains, contingency, critical junctures, and 'powder keg' explanations, and the role of necessary conditions in each. *Explaining War and Peace* will be of great interest to students of qualitative analysis, the First World War, the Cold War, international history and international relations theory in general.

**On Grand Strategy** - John Lewis Gaddis  
2018-04-03

A master class in strategic thinking, distilled from the legendary program the author has co-taught at Yale for decades. For almost two decades, Yale students have competed for admission each year to the "Studies in Grand Strategy" seminar taught by John Lewis Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, and Charles Hill. Its purpose has been to prepare future leaders for responsibilities they will face, through lessons drawn from history and the classics. Now Gaddis has distilled that teaching into a succinct, sharp and potentially transformational book, surveying

statecraft from the ancient Greeks to Franklin D. Roosevelt and beyond. An unforgettable guide to the art of leadership, *On Grand Strategy* is, in every way, its own master class.

**On War** - Carl von Clausewitz 1908

### **War, Peace and International Relations -**

Colin S. Gray 2007-06-11

Chapter Introduction: Strategic history -- chapter 1 Themes and contexts of strategic history -- chapter 2 Carl von Clausewitz and the theory of war -- chapter 3 From limited war to national war: The French Revolution and the Napoleonic way of war -- chapter 4 The nineteenth century, I: A strategic view -- chapter 5 The nineteenth century, II: Technology, warfare and international order -- chapter 6 World War I, I: Controversies -- chapter 7 World War I, II: Modern warfare -- chapter 8 The twenty-year armistice, 1919-39 -- chapter 9 The mechanization of war -- chapter 10 World War II in Europe, I: The structure and course of total

war -- chapter 11 World War II in Europe, II: Understanding the war -- chapter 12 World War II in Asia-Pacific, I: Japan and the politics of empire -- chapter 13 World War II in Asia-Pacific, II: Strategy and warfare -- chapter 14 The Cold War, I: Politics and ideology -- chapter 15 The Cold War, II: The nuclear revolution -- chapter 16 War and peace after the Cold War: An interwar decade -- chapter 17 9/11 and the age of terror -- chapter 18 Irregular warfare: Guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists -- chapter 19 War, peace and international order -- chapter 20 Conclusion: Must future strategic history resemble the past?.

**Fascist and Liberal Visions of War** - Azar Gat 1998

Showing how theories of mechanized war in the air and on land developed throughout the industrial world in the first decades of the 20th century, this text examines how the pioneers of these theories were associated with fascism. *On the Meaning of Victory* - Edward Luttwak

1986

Examines the problems and possibilities facing the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, from the threat of nuclear war and the military's strategic thinking, to the interplay of politics, personality, and history

**Strategy** - Edward N. Luttwak 2002-01-31

"If you want peace, prepare for war." "A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive."

"The worst road may be the best route to battle." Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows—they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict. In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of "post-heroic" war in Kosovo in 1999—an American war in which not a single

American soldier was killed. In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world's foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.

**The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy** -

Edward N. Luttwak 2012-11-15

As the rest of the world worries about what a future might look like under Chinese supremacy, Luttwak worries about China's own future prospects. Applying the logic of strategy for which he is well known, he argues that the world's second largest economy may be headed

for a fall unless China's leaders check their military ambitions.

**Great Strategic Rivalries** - James Lacey  
2016-10-11

From the legendary antagonism between Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War to the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars of the twentieth century, the past is littered with long-term strategic rivalries. History tells us that such enduring rivalries can end in one of three ways: a series of exhausting conflicts in which one side eventually prevails, as in the case of the Punic Wars between ancient Rome and Carthage, a peaceful and hopefully orderly transition, like the rivalry between Great Britain and the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, or a one-sided collapse, such as the conclusion of the Cold War with the fall of the Soviet Union. However, in spite of a wealth of historical examples, the future of state rivalries remains a matter of conjecture. *Great Strategic Rivalries* explores the causes and

implications of past strategic rivalries, revealing lessons for the current geopolitical landscape. Each chapter offers an accessible narrative of a historically significant rivalry, comprehensively covering the political, diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions of its history. Featuring original essays by world-class historians--including Barry Strauss, Geoffrey Parker, Williamson Murray, and Geoffrey Wawro--this collection provides an in-depth look at how interstate relations develop into often violent rivalries and how these are ultimately resolved. Much more than an engaging history, *Great Strategic Rivalries* contains valuable insight into current conflicts around the globe for policymakers and policy watchers alike.

**The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire**  
- Edward N. Luttwak 2009-11-15

In this book, the distinguished writer Edward Luttwak presents the grand strategy of the eastern Roman empire we know as Byzantine, which lasted more than twice as long as the

more familiar western Roman empire. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is a broad, interpretive account of Byzantine strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy over the course of eight centuries that will appeal to scholars, classicists, military history buffs, and professional soldiers.

*Our New National Security Strategy* - James John Tritten 1992

This book is an analysis of President Bush's Regional Defense Strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. This strategy involves a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental United States where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the United States would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation Desert Storm. The new

national security strategy is based upon the 25 percent budget cut negotiated with Congress, a greatly depleted Russian threat, and a new international security environment that assumes two-years' warning of a European-centered global war with the former USSR. There are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends: (1) the continued decline of the Russians as a threat to world stability; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges; (3) the behavior of the allies and Congress; and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy, but rather a fundamental revision of the way the United States has approached defense since 1945. Students and scholars interested in politico-military strategy and government policy will find this book of great interest.

**The Practice of Strategy** - John Andreas Olsen  
2011-10-27

The Practice of Strategy focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practiced over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in present-day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles, but also to times of peace that were over-shadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation-state policies. Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as 'the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means,' these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence

of political objectives, operational schemes of manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present. Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.

### **The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought** - Lukas Milevski 2016

In strategic studies and international relations, grand strategy is a frequently-invoked concept. Yet, despite its popularity, it is not well

understood and it has many definitions, some of which are even mutually contradictory. This state of affairs undermines its usefulness for scholars and practitioners alike. Lukas Milevski aims to remedy this situation by offering a conceptual history of grand strategy in the English language, analysing its evolution from 1805 to the present day in the writings of its major proponents. In doing so, he seeks to clarify the meaning and role of the concept, both theoretically and practically, and shed light on its continuing utility today.

*War on Peace* - Ronan Farrow 2018-04-24

A book for anyone interested to know more about how the world really works by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Ronan Farrow. 'This is one of the most important books of our time.' Walter Isaacson 'A masterpiece' Dan Simpson, Post-Gazette THE NEW YORK TIMES #3 BESTSELLER US foreign policy is undergoing a dire transformation, forever changing America's place in the world. Institutions of diplomacy and

development are bleeding out after deep budget cuts; the diplomats who make America's deals and protect democratic interests around the world are walking out in droves. Offices across the State Department sit empty, while abroad the military-industrial complex has assumed the work once undertaken by peacemakers.

Increasingly, America is a nation that shoots first and asks questions later. In an astonishing journey from the corridors of power in Washington, DC, to some of the most remote and dangerous places on earth - Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Korea among them acclaimed investigative journalist Ronan Farrow illuminates one of the most consequential and poorly understood changes in American history. His first-hand experience as a former State Department official affords a personal look at some of the last standard bearers of traditional statecraft, including Richard Holbrooke, who made peace in Bosnia and died while trying to do so in Afghanistan. Drawing on newly

unearthed documents, and richly informed by rare interviews with warlords, whistle-blowers, and policymakers - including every living secretary of state from Henry Kissinger to Hillary Clinton to Rex Tillerson - War on Peace makes a powerful case for an endangered profession. Diplomacy, Farrow argues, has declined after decades of political cowardice, short-sightedness, and outright malice - but it may just offer a way out of a world at war.

**Coup D'état** - Edward Idttwak 1969

War, Peace, and Human Nature - Douglas P. Fry  
2015-02

"The chapters in this book [posit] that humans clearly have the capacity to make war, but since war is absent in some cultures, it cannot be viewed as a human universal. And counter to frequent presumption, the actual archaeological record reveals the recent emergence of war. It does not typify the ancestral type of human society, the nomadic forager band, and contrary

to widespread assumptions, there is little support for the idea that war is ancient or an evolved adaptation. Views of human nature as inherently warlike stem not from the facts but from cultural views embedded in Western thinking"--Amazon.com.

*The Evolution of Strategy* - Beatrice Heuser  
2010-10-14

Is there a 'Western way of war' which pursues battles of annihilation and single-minded military victory? Is warfare on a path to ever greater destructive force? This magisterial account answers these questions by tracing the history of Western thinking about strategy - the employment of military force as a political instrument - from antiquity to the present day. Assessing sources from Vegetius to contemporary America, and with a particular focus on strategy since the Napoleonic Wars, Beatrice Heuser explores the evolution of strategic thought, the social institutions, norms and patterns of behaviour within which it

operates, the policies that guide it and the cultures that influence it. Ranging across technology and warfare, total warfare and small wars as well as land, sea, air and nuclear warfare, she demonstrates that warfare and strategic thinking have fluctuated wildly in their aims, intensity, limitations and excesses over the past two millennia.

*The United States, China, and Taiwan* - Robert Blackwill 2021-02-11

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, *The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War*, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war

over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the

most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

**Endangered American Dream** - Edward N.

Luttwak 2010-05-11

One of America's most thoughtful and provocative strategists exposes the economic and cultural assumptions that have driven the U.S. to the brink of social and financial collapse. Edward Luttwak reveals a forceful new policy that can reverse America's decline.

**The Rights of War and Peace** - Richard Tuck  
2001-09-06

The Rights of War and Peace is the first fully historical account of the formative period of modern theories of international law. It sets the scene with an extensive history of the theory of international relations from antiquity down to the seventeenth century. Professor Tuck then examines the arguments over the moral basis for war and international aggression, and links the debates to the writings of the great political theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. This is not only an account of international law: as Professor Tuck shows, ideas about interstate relations were central to the formation of

modern liberal political theory, for the best example the kind of agent which liberalism presupposes was provided by the modern state. As a result the book illuminates the presuppositions behind much current political theory, and puts into a new perspective the connection between liberalism and imperialism. *The Leverage of Sea Power* - Colin S. Gray 1992 "Through colourful and lively historical illustrations as well as strategic theory, Gray shows how sea power, when integrated with land and air power, increases the combatant's opportunities and choices. With dozens of examples from the Greek and Persian wars of the fifth century B.C. through the recent war in the Gulf, Gray systematically demonstrates the ways sea power has been used, and how it might have been used, to win battles and wars. His thought-provoking commentary is certain to become essential reading for the makers of defense policy today. *The Leverage of Sea Power* is an important and original contribution to the

science of warfare historically and in the nuclear age." --

**The Logic of Violence in Civil War** - Stathis N. Kalyvas 2006-05-01

By analytically decoupling war and violence, this book explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war. Against the prevailing view that such violence is an instance of impenetrable madness, the book demonstrates that there is logic to it and that it has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than currently believed. Kalyvas specifies a novel theory of selective violence: it is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them. Violence, he finds, is never a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly interactive character defeats simple maximization logics while producing surprising outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the 'frontlines' of civil war.

*The Russian Understanding of War* - Oscar Jonsson 2019-11-01

This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites

see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.